Who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon?
John F. Sullivan from The Strategy Bridge poses an interesting question, Who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon? Is this an relevant question or a distraction?
It is not only the military who have their traditions which at times restricts their view and slows their evolution of understanding conflict and warfare. It would seem those who study strategy, tactics and the fighting of wars also have their traditions.
There are examples from antiquity that exhort the study of great commanders or battles and how they were won or lost, preferably both. Polyaenus was a 2nd-century Macedonian, who dedicated his collection of Stratagems (Strategemata) to the Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, when they set out on a war against the Parthians, in 163 A.D. His intention was to provide the emperors with brief examples of the exploits of earlier generals, which they could copy, modify or be inspired by in their Parthian war.
Sextus Julius Frontinus (40–103 A.D.) a prominent Roman civil engineer, author, successful general under Domitian, commanding forces in Roman Britain, the Rhine and Danube frontiers and consul three times, wrote in his introduction to his work, Strategemata: Since I alone of those interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish it,. I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarize in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name strategemata. For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds. There will result the added advantage that a general will not fear the issue of his own stratagem, if he compares it with experiments already successfully made. For since this work, like my preceding ones, has been undertaken for the benefit of others, rather than for the sake of my own renown, I shall feel that I am being aided, rather than criticized, by those who will make additions to it.
The wisdom of Frontinus is that he sees anyone adding to his efforts as an ally in a worthy campaign. It seems he believed the content is of far more importance than the author or number of authors.
In keeping with Polyaenus and Frontinus, Bonaparte did advise other commanders to study those generals who had gone before them. However, within this message was a far more important message that is rarely mentioned in the same breath. General Burnod in his compilation ‘The Military Maxims of Napoleon’, writes: Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederic. Make them your models. This is the only way to become a great general and to master the secrets of the art of war. With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders. Is this explanation of why all generals are fighting the previous war and not the current conflict? He goes on: Tactics, evolutions and the science of the engineer and the artillery officer may be learned from treatises, but generalship is acquired only by experience and the study of the campaigns of all great captains. With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders.
It is not only the military who have their traditions which at times restricts their view and slows their evolution of understanding conflict and warfare. It would seem those who study strategy, tactics and the fighting of wars also have their traditions.
There are examples from antiquity that exhort the study of great commanders or battles and how they were won or lost, preferably both. Polyaenus was a 2nd-century Macedonian, who dedicated his collection of Stratagems (Strategemata) to the Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, when they set out on a war against the Parthians, in 163 A.D. His intention was to provide the emperors with brief examples of the exploits of earlier generals, which they could copy, modify or be inspired by in their Parthian war.
Sextus Julius Frontinus (40–103 A.D.) a prominent Roman civil engineer, author, successful general under Domitian, commanding forces in Roman Britain, the Rhine and Danube frontiers and consul three times, wrote in his introduction to his work, Strategemata: Since I alone of those interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish it,. I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarize in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name strategemata. For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds. There will result the added advantage that a general will not fear the issue of his own stratagem, if he compares it with experiments already successfully made. For since this work, like my preceding ones, has been undertaken for the benefit of others, rather than for the sake of my own renown, I shall feel that I am being aided, rather than criticized, by those who will make additions to it.
The wisdom of Frontinus is that he sees anyone adding to his efforts as an ally in a worthy campaign. It seems he believed the content is of far more importance than the author or number of authors.
In keeping with Polyaenus and Frontinus, Bonaparte did advise other commanders to study those generals who had gone before them. However, within this message was a far more important message that is rarely mentioned in the same breath. General Burnod in his compilation ‘The Military Maxims of Napoleon’, writes: Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederic. Make them your models. This is the only way to become a great general and to master the secrets of the art of war. With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders. Is this explanation of why all generals are fighting the previous war and not the current conflict? He goes on: Tactics, evolutions and the science of the engineer and the artillery officer may be learned from treatises, but generalship is acquired only by experience and the study of the campaigns of all great captains. With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders.
With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders.
The most critical point of this passage is missed by most readers, the genius is to be enlightened by this study, not controlled or substituted. How many battles won show that the critical factor to the victory was the rejection of such doctrine, and so by doing the illogical, the battle was won. One of the best known examples of the use of the Empty Fort Strategy, appearing strong when actually extremely weak, is a fictional incident in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Zhuge Liang receiving reports that his enemy, Sima Yi was approaching his undefended fort, ordered the gates opened and all residents to hide. Zhuge Liang according to logic and accepted military doctrine should have fled or organised some kind of fighting defence. He did the opposite. Sima Yi was surprised to see Zhuge Liang drinking tea on a balcony and not a soldier or any kind of defensive effort in view. Taking into account the reputation Zhuge Liang for deception and tactical brilliance, he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was a trap.
Sun Tzu it seems understood this point so he wrote this maxim, “while heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules”. Could it be the author of the Art of War, realised that he could not include every detail a commander needs to know to be victorious, that there would be situations that his experience and imagination could not image? Therefore he could not attend to in his thirteen or so chapters. Could it be that he then chose to structure his Bing-fa in a more philosophical style then the normal ‘a dummy’s guide to warfare’ effort that was common to his era and previously? May he have concentrated on ‘principles’ and the ‘dynamics’ of warfare and war, inspiring the reader, general, commander or lowly leader of a section of infantry, how to think, not what to think?
The picturesque tale of the young Isaac Newton sitting in his garden when an apple falls on his head and, in a stroke of brilliance, he ‘discovers’ gravity may explain to the layman the idea behind gravity but to claim he discovered gravity is misleading in so many ways as to distract the significance of the event. Better to say he was the first who could express and codify it in manner others could accept and understand. Sun Tzu did not refer to any such force by name but he did refer to it “. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill”. The key understanding on offer here is to understand that forces need not be ‘tagged’ and explained in tedious detail to be known, understood and used for benefit. This is the greatest argument that the tome, Art of War, is not the beginning and end of what a commander needs to know about war, warfare or military matters. From Newtons’ understanding of gravity rose other scientific understandings like aerodynamics. Indeed, Newtons ‘discovery’ was not the first beginning but one of several new fields of scientific interest, and so is the Art of War in a military sense.
The written observations of Thucydides, Frontinus, Polyaenus and so many others, are not bottle of fine wine that improve and gain value with the passage of time. They are what they are, observations of great men and great minds. Nothing more, nothing less. There is another reference to the world of wine that is relatable. The idea of provenance. While the value of a bottle of wine or painting depends greatly on provenance, its taste or drinkability of it is quite a separate reality. So too, the education of a commander. Military institutions of various kinds over the centuries have educated military leaders but none can verify their quality until they are tested under the brutality and unpredictability of battle. Spartan lives were dedicated to the preparation of battle, yet they had excellent commanders and complete duds as well. The highly respected military training instruction of West Point, has produced great commanders and some not so great commanders. Education is a benefit but it guarantees nothing. So again, is the question, who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon, relevant to the real world or only to the universe of scholars?
Sun Tzu it seems understood this point so he wrote this maxim, “while heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules”. Could it be the author of the Art of War, realised that he could not include every detail a commander needs to know to be victorious, that there would be situations that his experience and imagination could not image? Therefore he could not attend to in his thirteen or so chapters. Could it be that he then chose to structure his Bing-fa in a more philosophical style then the normal ‘a dummy’s guide to warfare’ effort that was common to his era and previously? May he have concentrated on ‘principles’ and the ‘dynamics’ of warfare and war, inspiring the reader, general, commander or lowly leader of a section of infantry, how to think, not what to think?
The picturesque tale of the young Isaac Newton sitting in his garden when an apple falls on his head and, in a stroke of brilliance, he ‘discovers’ gravity may explain to the layman the idea behind gravity but to claim he discovered gravity is misleading in so many ways as to distract the significance of the event. Better to say he was the first who could express and codify it in manner others could accept and understand. Sun Tzu did not refer to any such force by name but he did refer to it “. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill”. The key understanding on offer here is to understand that forces need not be ‘tagged’ and explained in tedious detail to be known, understood and used for benefit. This is the greatest argument that the tome, Art of War, is not the beginning and end of what a commander needs to know about war, warfare or military matters. From Newtons’ understanding of gravity rose other scientific understandings like aerodynamics. Indeed, Newtons ‘discovery’ was not the first beginning but one of several new fields of scientific interest, and so is the Art of War in a military sense.
The written observations of Thucydides, Frontinus, Polyaenus and so many others, are not bottle of fine wine that improve and gain value with the passage of time. They are what they are, observations of great men and great minds. Nothing more, nothing less. There is another reference to the world of wine that is relatable. The idea of provenance. While the value of a bottle of wine or painting depends greatly on provenance, its taste or drinkability of it is quite a separate reality. So too, the education of a commander. Military institutions of various kinds over the centuries have educated military leaders but none can verify their quality until they are tested under the brutality and unpredictability of battle. Spartan lives were dedicated to the preparation of battle, yet they had excellent commanders and complete duds as well. The highly respected military training instruction of West Point, has produced great commanders and some not so great commanders. Education is a benefit but it guarantees nothing. So again, is the question, who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon, relevant to the real world or only to the universe of scholars?
Apart from those in academia of all descriptions, does it really matter if the author was one man or many?
When Shakespeare is taught in schools, time is not wasted on a detailed study of his times, those who learned from or may have influenced his thinking. There is even a debate on whether he was one man, many contributors or a very clever individual who stole the work of others. In essence, all this is only relevant to professors and academia. To the average consumer, the theatre goer, the work has to stand alone. Do they like it, understand it and does it move them? Has his work improved their lives or are they able to learn something that can be used to improve their lives? These are the important questions. These are the questions to apply to the Art of War.
Apart from those in academia of all descriptions, does it really matter if the author was one man or many? Does it matter if he had a Napoleon, Alexander or Hannibal, Zima Yi or Zhuge Liang? Does it really matter who the commander listened to or studied? In reality no! The information or knowledge a commander relies on is as only as valuable as his or her understanding and their ability to apply it at the right time in the right situation. There are commanders in history who never studied other commanders, great, inspirational or otherwise, yet won battles and wars.
Does it matter who the role of ‘Napoleon’ was for Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Mao Zedong, George Patton, Irwin Rommel or Sun Tzu. There is a memorable scene in the 1970 movie, when George C Scott, playing the role of the WWII general, General George Patton yells in victorious celebration, “Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book” Was Rommel used by Patton to be his “Napoleon” or did he simply understand the principles described in the book and had the smarts to know how and when to use the principles. Have you ever decided someone solely based on their list of mentors or library content?
Today’s commanders fight yesterday’s war, is a complaint that can generate a very heated argument. If it is true though, is this not a valid argument against the importance or relevance of needing a ‘Napoleon’. Mainly because all their experience and knowledge was gained and tested in the wars they fought and this real world experience will overwhelm anything read in a book, regardless of the provenance of the author. If military leaders have gained their experience of war and are guided by studying the words of previous leaders, is it any wonder their thinking is rooted in the past. In addition, is there any guarantee that the message, tactic or wisdom will not be misinterpreted, misunderstood or misapplied? None.
With the introduction of jet fighters in the Korean War, common belief amongst fighter command held that the fighter tactics of WWII would have to be rewritten. Reality proved that the fighter pilots tactical handbook of WWII only needed updating, not rewriting. Certain ‘laws’ or behaviour patterns proved to be lifesaving, even the ones first recognised, ‘discovered’ in WWI. Lessons like, attack with the sun behind you and always watch for the ‘Hun in the Sun’ and never fly straight for too long. While it may be easier to understand the words of recent commanders, there is the trap of not seeing the forest for the trees and the trees for the forest.
In reality, there is nothing new about strategy and tactics we know now that has not crossed the minds of commanders over the millennia. The only change is how it is perceived, applied, taught, and the tools with which we use to implement the principles of strategy and tactics.
The laws of strategy and tactics are identical to the laws of nature and the universe. They are intangible, invisible, complex and never changing. Such laws can only be appreciated, witnessed and studied through their effects. Is it possible to ever fully, truly understand any universal law? However, due to their timeless and utter consistency, they can be studied both by their current activity and the historical evidence of their impact in the past. So this at least offers an opening that there is some value to studying the ancients like Thucydides, Plato, Sun Tzu, Sima Yi and long dead commanders, thinkers and observers.
The movement of air is directly categorised by the effects it has on its environment. Wind cannot be seen, only its effects. A two hundred mile an hour wind twenty thousand feet above the ground, that can slow the progress of a jet passenger aircraft cannot be seen from the ground, however it is there and will affect those who have to meet the aircraft to pick up passengers on that flight due to delayed landing time. Likewise, just because the effects of a strategy or tactic can’t be seen, does not mean it is not there and has no consequences. So was there a strategy and tactics, deliberately chosen in how the book was written? We know Sun Tzu, like Frontinus and Polyaenus wanted to be a ‘Napoleon’ to others. Frontinus to young, inexperienced commanders. Polyaenus to Emperors. Who was Sun Tzu’s intended audience? Could Sun Tzu ever imagine his words would survive over two millennia and if he did, would this thought changed what he wrote or how he wrote it? Who did he want to be ‘Napoleon to?
A wise and victorious commander maintains both a micro and macro outlook on war and warfare. Such a commander has the ability to metaphorically look through both ends of the telescope and mainly keep the telescope in its container, only using it when it fills a need to do so.
Information is not wisdom, wisdom is not action. Information is dead and always historical. Information does, at times, offer possibilities and confidence. Wisdom is more than knowing, it is understanding and so timeless and timely. Understanding, not just of the information but its use, the who, the when, the what, the how and the why. Wisdom is the child of information and experience. Information is external, experience is external.
Apart from those in academia of all descriptions, does it really matter if the author was one man or many? Does it matter if he had a Napoleon, Alexander or Hannibal, Zima Yi or Zhuge Liang? Does it really matter who the commander listened to or studied? In reality no! The information or knowledge a commander relies on is as only as valuable as his or her understanding and their ability to apply it at the right time in the right situation. There are commanders in history who never studied other commanders, great, inspirational or otherwise, yet won battles and wars.
Does it matter who the role of ‘Napoleon’ was for Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Mao Zedong, George Patton, Irwin Rommel or Sun Tzu. There is a memorable scene in the 1970 movie, when George C Scott, playing the role of the WWII general, General George Patton yells in victorious celebration, “Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book” Was Rommel used by Patton to be his “Napoleon” or did he simply understand the principles described in the book and had the smarts to know how and when to use the principles. Have you ever decided someone solely based on their list of mentors or library content?
Today’s commanders fight yesterday’s war, is a complaint that can generate a very heated argument. If it is true though, is this not a valid argument against the importance or relevance of needing a ‘Napoleon’. Mainly because all their experience and knowledge was gained and tested in the wars they fought and this real world experience will overwhelm anything read in a book, regardless of the provenance of the author. If military leaders have gained their experience of war and are guided by studying the words of previous leaders, is it any wonder their thinking is rooted in the past. In addition, is there any guarantee that the message, tactic or wisdom will not be misinterpreted, misunderstood or misapplied? None.
With the introduction of jet fighters in the Korean War, common belief amongst fighter command held that the fighter tactics of WWII would have to be rewritten. Reality proved that the fighter pilots tactical handbook of WWII only needed updating, not rewriting. Certain ‘laws’ or behaviour patterns proved to be lifesaving, even the ones first recognised, ‘discovered’ in WWI. Lessons like, attack with the sun behind you and always watch for the ‘Hun in the Sun’ and never fly straight for too long. While it may be easier to understand the words of recent commanders, there is the trap of not seeing the forest for the trees and the trees for the forest.
In reality, there is nothing new about strategy and tactics we know now that has not crossed the minds of commanders over the millennia. The only change is how it is perceived, applied, taught, and the tools with which we use to implement the principles of strategy and tactics.
The laws of strategy and tactics are identical to the laws of nature and the universe. They are intangible, invisible, complex and never changing. Such laws can only be appreciated, witnessed and studied through their effects. Is it possible to ever fully, truly understand any universal law? However, due to their timeless and utter consistency, they can be studied both by their current activity and the historical evidence of their impact in the past. So this at least offers an opening that there is some value to studying the ancients like Thucydides, Plato, Sun Tzu, Sima Yi and long dead commanders, thinkers and observers.
The movement of air is directly categorised by the effects it has on its environment. Wind cannot be seen, only its effects. A two hundred mile an hour wind twenty thousand feet above the ground, that can slow the progress of a jet passenger aircraft cannot be seen from the ground, however it is there and will affect those who have to meet the aircraft to pick up passengers on that flight due to delayed landing time. Likewise, just because the effects of a strategy or tactic can’t be seen, does not mean it is not there and has no consequences. So was there a strategy and tactics, deliberately chosen in how the book was written? We know Sun Tzu, like Frontinus and Polyaenus wanted to be a ‘Napoleon’ to others. Frontinus to young, inexperienced commanders. Polyaenus to Emperors. Who was Sun Tzu’s intended audience? Could Sun Tzu ever imagine his words would survive over two millennia and if he did, would this thought changed what he wrote or how he wrote it? Who did he want to be ‘Napoleon to?
A wise and victorious commander maintains both a micro and macro outlook on war and warfare. Such a commander has the ability to metaphorically look through both ends of the telescope and mainly keep the telescope in its container, only using it when it fills a need to do so.
Information is not wisdom, wisdom is not action. Information is dead and always historical. Information does, at times, offer possibilities and confidence. Wisdom is more than knowing, it is understanding and so timeless and timely. Understanding, not just of the information but its use, the who, the when, the what, the how and the why. Wisdom is the child of information and experience. Information is external, experience is external.
Wisdom is the child of information and experience
General Burnod, ‘The Military Maxims of Napoleon Bonaparte, eluded to such when he wrote Napoleon believed, with your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders’.
Conclusions are rarely included in debates of Sun Tzus’ maxims on foreknowledge. Curious. Being the first to understand is greatly underrated as an advantage or as foreknowledge. Sun Tzu rates foreknowledge of great importance. It is the basis of reputations of other less acclaimed warriors like Sir Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein. Does their work depend or is it judged largely or at all by their Napoleon? As in the military field of endeavour, it is similar in the scientific field, he who understands first holds a great advantage over all else. Did not Bonaparte learn from others, but he was the first to a new understanding of how to conduct war and this ‘foreknowledge’ enabled him to be emperor twice.
In The Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi, he compares the way of a carpenter, he does not name any famous carpenters. Do carpenters need their own ‘Bonaparte’?
A tradesman does not blame his tools, nor is he limited by them. If necessity is the mother of invention, the inspiration is the father. The bulk of frustration and abandonment of the Art of War and Sun Tzu can be laid at the door of understanding or lack thereof. If the maxims of Sun Tzu are too closely followed or too loosely understood, if the wisdom of the Art of War is incorrectly used, those suffering from a lack of success blame the author or the book instead of their own lack of understanding. Not just of the book or the authors’ message but of conflict, war and warfare in general and detail.
Actions speak louder than words. How the information, the theorem, proposition or dynamic, is actioned, that reveals the true level of understanding. Maxims, principles or dynamics are neither right nor wrong, only their application.
So does it really matter who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon? No. Is it really possible to get into the head of another? If it is a challenge to do so with someone we are talking to, how much more difficult to do with someone dead for over two millennia or more. Sun Tzu sums this up nicely with this maxim. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. So we are trying to get into the head of one long dead commander by getting into the heads of other long dead commanders.
Every author has a bias and a philosophy. Both are revealed in their writings. Plato, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Julius Caesar, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, Irwin Rommel, B.H. Liddell Hart and John Boyd were men of their times and wrote as men of their times. While this can be a tough barrier to pierce, it is only that, a barrier to pierce. It does not necessitate being an expert of their times or their lives. While such information is useful and interesting, it is not central to the validity or usefulness of their message or philosophy.
Understanding the central, core message is an antidote to both bias and philosophy. Studying the Art of War is like walking through a shopping centre, one becomes aware of what is available for other times while seeking out and acquiring what is needed for the challenge at hand. Sometimes it is enough to know what is available, you don’t have to buy everything at once. As times change, needs change and so requirements change. Knowing where to come back to for the tools or solutions is as important as what is needed to deal with the present.
The test of any such text is to completely remove them from famous authors, their Napoleon and from the times in which the words were written and evaluate if they stand not only the test of time but the circumstances under which they were deployed. Lao Tzu said, a wise man will always learn more from a fool then a fool from a hundred wise men. This is because the wise man will separate the message or argument from the source and evaluate such on merit alone.
The study of history and the study of strategies and tactics overlap a great deal, they are not one and the same. The benefits may seem similar but application is vastly different. The influences of one commanders’ counsel over another is a distraction from understanding the wisdom each offer. Each of their maxims, truisms, ideas and the totality of their commentary must prove worthy, useful and effective in dealing with the problems at hand. This is the final, ultimate test.
Sun Tzu’s compact thirteen chapters and the historical offerings by past commanders and deep thinkers are merely the start and the continuous pit stops of the journey.
Conclusions are rarely included in debates of Sun Tzus’ maxims on foreknowledge. Curious. Being the first to understand is greatly underrated as an advantage or as foreknowledge. Sun Tzu rates foreknowledge of great importance. It is the basis of reputations of other less acclaimed warriors like Sir Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein. Does their work depend or is it judged largely or at all by their Napoleon? As in the military field of endeavour, it is similar in the scientific field, he who understands first holds a great advantage over all else. Did not Bonaparte learn from others, but he was the first to a new understanding of how to conduct war and this ‘foreknowledge’ enabled him to be emperor twice.
In The Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi, he compares the way of a carpenter, he does not name any famous carpenters. Do carpenters need their own ‘Bonaparte’?
A tradesman does not blame his tools, nor is he limited by them. If necessity is the mother of invention, the inspiration is the father. The bulk of frustration and abandonment of the Art of War and Sun Tzu can be laid at the door of understanding or lack thereof. If the maxims of Sun Tzu are too closely followed or too loosely understood, if the wisdom of the Art of War is incorrectly used, those suffering from a lack of success blame the author or the book instead of their own lack of understanding. Not just of the book or the authors’ message but of conflict, war and warfare in general and detail.
Actions speak louder than words. How the information, the theorem, proposition or dynamic, is actioned, that reveals the true level of understanding. Maxims, principles or dynamics are neither right nor wrong, only their application.
So does it really matter who was Sun Tzu’s Napoleon? No. Is it really possible to get into the head of another? If it is a challenge to do so with someone we are talking to, how much more difficult to do with someone dead for over two millennia or more. Sun Tzu sums this up nicely with this maxim. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. So we are trying to get into the head of one long dead commander by getting into the heads of other long dead commanders.
Every author has a bias and a philosophy. Both are revealed in their writings. Plato, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Julius Caesar, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, Irwin Rommel, B.H. Liddell Hart and John Boyd were men of their times and wrote as men of their times. While this can be a tough barrier to pierce, it is only that, a barrier to pierce. It does not necessitate being an expert of their times or their lives. While such information is useful and interesting, it is not central to the validity or usefulness of their message or philosophy.
Understanding the central, core message is an antidote to both bias and philosophy. Studying the Art of War is like walking through a shopping centre, one becomes aware of what is available for other times while seeking out and acquiring what is needed for the challenge at hand. Sometimes it is enough to know what is available, you don’t have to buy everything at once. As times change, needs change and so requirements change. Knowing where to come back to for the tools or solutions is as important as what is needed to deal with the present.
The test of any such text is to completely remove them from famous authors, their Napoleon and from the times in which the words were written and evaluate if they stand not only the test of time but the circumstances under which they were deployed. Lao Tzu said, a wise man will always learn more from a fool then a fool from a hundred wise men. This is because the wise man will separate the message or argument from the source and evaluate such on merit alone.
The study of history and the study of strategies and tactics overlap a great deal, they are not one and the same. The benefits may seem similar but application is vastly different. The influences of one commanders’ counsel over another is a distraction from understanding the wisdom each offer. Each of their maxims, truisms, ideas and the totality of their commentary must prove worthy, useful and effective in dealing with the problems at hand. This is the final, ultimate test.
Sun Tzu’s compact thirteen chapters and the historical offerings by past commanders and deep thinkers are merely the start and the continuous pit stops of the journey.